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From Grounding to Supervenience?∗
Stephan Leuenberger
1 Explicating determination claims
Philosophers are in the business of formulating hypotheses of dependence and
determination between various realms of reality, or various kinds of facts.
For example, physicalists and naturalists wish to claim, respectively, that
the mental is determined by the physical, and that the moral is determined
by the natural. To make such hypotheses precise and amenable for rigor-
ous discussion, philosophers have sought to express them in a regimented
idiom. The question what idiom is suitable for that purpose has become an
important philosophical topic in its own right. This article aims to clarify
the relationship between two relations that are often invoked in this context:
grounding and supervenience.
During the heyday of modal metaphysics, the language of supervenience
was the idiom of choice for many. It appears to be precise and ideologically
unproblematic.1 It is flexible, and can accommodate a variety of different
relata, notably properties and facts.
In recent years, that use of supervenience has widely gone out of favour.
The complaints are familiar. I shall rehearse what I take to be the two main
ones. First, the target notions of determination and dependence are hyperin-
tensional, while supervenience is not. As a consequence, supervenience fails
to make any discrimination in the realm of the non-contingent. Second, the
target notions are asymmetric. Supervenience, in contrast, fails to be asym-
metric. Indeed, it even satisfies the condition of reflexivity, which precludes
asymmmetry.
∗Thanks to an anonymous referee, whose suggestions led to a number of improvements.
1Whether or not it presupposes any extravagant ontology is a disputed question that I
shall leave aside.
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Few sustained attempts at defending the use of supervenience have been
undertaken.2 In my view, the jury is still out on the question whether the
complaints can be answered.
Instead of being modified, supervenience-theoretic approaches to depen-
dence and determination among facts have been widely abandoned. Efforts
have been directed at rehabilitating a primitive notion of determination.
That notion typically goes under the label of “grounding”.3
In this article, I shall investigate the relationship between grounding and
supervenience—or more precisely, global supervenience of facts. I shall claim
that there is a deeper ideological schism between supervenience and ground-
ing than meets the eye. While they do indeed differ with respect to asym-
metry and hyperintensionality, they also differ in a further, and arguably
deeper, respect. The difference concerns the first relata: for grounding, they
are pluralities or classes of facts; for global supervenience, they are types of
facts.
I shall explain what I mean by types of facts in due course. But one
clarification is required immedatiately. Since ‘supervenience’ is a term of art,
one could argue that it is a matter of stipulation and not of discovery what
the relata are. However, not all stipulations are equally fruitful. My claim
is that distinctive and interesting global supervenience claims have different
relata than grounding claims.
This thesis will emerge from consideration of the following question: are
there any corresponding supervenience claims that are entailed by grounding
claims? The often-heard complaint that supervenience claims are too weak
to capture grounding claims suggests that there are. But the question is
not typically posed explicitly. In this respect, it differs from the question
whether the converse entailment holds. Friends of grounding are explicit
that it does not, and the counterexamples relate to the complaints rehearsed
above: every fact supervenes on itself, but is not grounded by itself; necessary
facts supervene on, but are not grounded by, the fact that it is sunny today.
An answer to the question whether there are corresponding supervenience
claims entailed by grounding claims should be of interest to several groups
of philosophers.
Friends of grounding can use it to articulate the relationship between
2Though see Post (1999) for an argument that non-asymmetry is a virtue of superve-
nience.
3By now, the literature on grounding is too large to cite fully here. For a sample of
influential contributions, see Rosen (2010), Fine (2012), and Schaffer (2009).
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grounding and another, more familiar concept. In conjunction with paradigms,
foils, and logical features, such conceptual links are crucial in helping us grasp
theoretically useful primitives.
Skeptics about grounding may take a negative answer to be further con-
firmation of their suspicion that grounding is insufficiently constrained. They
may also feel vindicated in their complaint that we are not told how to eval-
uate grounding claims. If grounding claims did entail supervenience, then we
would at least know how they can be attacked: by what Brian McLaughlin
(1984) calls a “FIST”, a failure of implied supervenience thesis. Philosophers
are adept at describing pairs of putatively possible worlds that purport to
falsify supervenience claims.
Theorists of supervenience may see the answer as contributing to clarify
how global supervenience applies to fact-like entities. So far, theoretical at-
tention has focussed on global supervenience for properties.4 This is surpris-
ing, since many of the informal uses of supervenience, outside the specialized
literature, take the relata to be facts. For example, David Papineau (2008,
p. 127) takes the basic content of physicalism to be the claim that “[a]ll facts
metaphysically supervene on the physical facts”.
Finally, neutrals may appreciate being in a better position to contrast and
compare the claims that have been expressed in the idiom of supervenience in
the last decades with the claims that are now being expressed in the idiom of
grounding. If they have a firmer grasp on supervenience than on grounding,
they can use entailment theses to extract a “cash value” from grounding
claims.
2 A candidate entailment thesis
Grounding claims come in a variety of logical forms. Those that I shall be
concerned with are of the form ‘B1, B2, . . . ground A, where ‘A’, ‘B1’, etc
denote facts. So grounding claims are to be expressed by a predicate to be
flanked by a plural term on the left and a singular term on the right.5
Instead of enumerating the grounds in a list, I shall often use Greek
capitals to stand for such a list, and say ‘Γ grounds A’ instead of the above
4Bricker (2006) is an exception.
5Alternatively, grounding can be construed as a binary sentential operator, like ‘be-
cause’ in English. I shall not pursue the interesting question how this alternative choice
would affect the discussion.
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(where Γ stands for {B1, B2, . . .}). For convenience and familiarity, I shall
also take Γ to be a class rather than a list; but when a class has just one
member, I will talk of the member as the ground, rather than its unit class.
On the conception of facts used here, facts do not exist at a world unless
they obtain at that world. The expression ‘Γ grounds A’ is taken to be false
in a possible world where A or some member of Γ does not exist.
The term ‘entailment’ is here used in the sense of strict implication: Φ
entails ψ iff in all possible worlds where all members of Φ are true, ψ is true
too. In an extended sense, ‘entailment’ applies to facts. For a fact A, let
O(A) mean that A obtains. Then Γ entails A iff {O(C) : C ∈ Γ} entails
O(A).
Given classical logic, a great many supervenience claims will be entailed
by the claim that Γ grounds A. For example, the claim that A supervenes on
itself will be entailed by any proposition, and a fortiori by any that happens to
be about grounding. Of course, we are interested in the putative entailment
of distinctive supervenience theses involving Γ and A.
Say that worlds w and w′ are A-indiscernible, for a fact A, if either A
obtains in both or fails to obtain in both. If Γ is a class of facts, worlds w
and w′ are Γ-indiscernible iff they are A-indiscernible for every A ∈ Γ. We
can then say that ∆ supervenes on Γ iff any worlds that are Γ-indiscernible
are also ∆-indiscernible. In this paper, we shall mostly be interested in the
special case where ∆ is a unit class {A}. To avoid clutter, I shall abbreviate
‘{A} supervenes on Γ’ to ‘A supervenes on Γ’.
Using the notion just defined, we might hypothesize the following (’S’ for
‘supervenience’):
S If Γ grounds A, then A supervenes on Γ.
S formulates an entailment thesis linking grounding and supervenience. It can
be read in two ways: as helping us to tease out broadly modal consequence
from a grounding claim, or as formulating a broadly modal constraint on
grounding.
Before discussing the tenability of S, I would like to draw attention to
one of its presuppositions: that a fact generates a partition of the class of
possible worlds into those in which it obtains, and those in which it does not
obtain. This presupposition is fairly unproblematic if facts have individuals
as constituents, and if those individuals, along with all other constituents,
can exist in more than one world. The fact that a is F then obtains in exactly
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those worlds in which a and F both exist and in which the former exemplifies
the latter.
However, the presupposition may fail on some other metaphysical concep-
tions of facts and their constituents. Suppose, for example, that individuals
are world-bound, and that the fact that a is F has a as a constituent. It
is then natural to invoke counterpart theory in stating the conditions under
which that fact obtains. But if a thing can have more than one counterpart
in a given world, no account may be intuitively satisfactory. Should we say
that the fact that a is F does obtain in a world in which a has one coun-
terpart that is F and one that is not, or should we say that it does not?6
Moreover, there may be more than one salient counterpart relation, leading
to further indeterminacy. So a counterpart theorist may not even be able to
make sense of S or its cousins to be considered later.7 But I shall leave this
worry about S aside in the following. It seems to be largely orthogonal to
the issues to be considered here.
3 The problem of multiple realizers
As it turns out, S is untenable. To see this, let B and C be modally indepen-
dent, and such that B obtains and C does not. Consider now the disjunctive
fact B∨C. Given that disjunctive facts are grounded by each true disjunct—a
principle typically assumed by friends of grounding—B grounds B∨C. Given
the modal independence of B and C, there is a world w where C obtains and
B does not, and there is a world w′ where neither B nor C obtains. So w
and w′ are B-indiscernible without being B ∨ C-indiscernible. Hence B ∨ C
does not supervene on B, and S is false.8
6For discussion of the analogous problem for propositions, see Dorr (2005). Note that
Dorr’s recommendation to the counterpart theorist—to adopt Russellian propositions—
would not solve the problem of associating a fact with a partition of modal space.
7Counterpart theorists may try to associate grounding claims with supervenience claims
with properties rather than facts as relata. But if the relata of grounding are facts, possibly
with a quantificational structure, it is not clear what those associated claims would be.
Furthermore, there is little reason to believe that the problems I raise for the fact-versions
would not carry over. However, a detailed discussion of that option is beyond the scope
of this paper.
8A structurally analogous counterexample involving being a brother and being a sibling
is used in McLaughlin and Bennett (2006) to show that property entailment is not sufficient
for supervenience among properties.
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One might question the assumption that there are disjunctive facts such
as B ∨ C. Perhaps facts are sparse, and just as disjunctive properties are
typically not countenanced in a theory that takes properties to be sparse, so
disjunctive facts may not be admitted in a theory of sparse facts. This reply,
however, is ineffective for two reasons.
First, the reply is hardly available to a theorist of grounding, who pre-
sumably wishes to explain sparseness in terms of grounding, and to claim
that the less sparse facts are grounded by the sparse ones. Second, the ob-
jection to S need not rely on facts that are disjunctive in any intuitive sense.
They need not have two other facts and disjunction as constituents, and their
canonical description need not involve the word “or” or a synonym. What is
required is merely that A has multiple realizers: in some world where one of
its actual grounds does not obtain, it still has a ground.9
For a plausible example, suppose that AT is a contingent thermodynamic
fact—the fact that the gas in a given container is at a temperature of 300◦
Kelvin, say. Further, suppose that BM is a complex fact about the kinetic
energy of every molecule in the container. For good measure, let BM also
include the laws of nature, and a totality fact to the effect that there are no
further molecules in the container. Then BM entails AT , and BM and AT
would appear to provide a paradigmatic instance of the grounding relation.
Yet AT does not entail BM : AT may have a different realizer—it may hold
in a world w even though the gas is in a different microstate in w. Then S is
falsified by w together with a world in which neither BM nor AT obtains.
In cases of multiple realizers, the worlds that jointy falsify the superve-
nience claim are ones where the grounding fact B fails to obtain. So it is
tempting to save supervenience by restricting it to worlds that are indis-
cernible from the actual world with respect to B. To be precise: A actuality-
sensitively supervenes on Γ iff any world that is Γ-indiscernible from @ (the
actual world) is also A-indiscernible from it.10 So-defined, actuality-sensitive
9This alternative ground of A may or may not be one that actually obtains. So A may
or may not have multiple realizers, or grounds, in the actual world.
10Actuality-sensitive supervenience is often invoked in the literature, although not under
that name. Bricker (2006) calls it “local”, as opposed to “global”, supervenience. I shall
avoid that terminology, since Kim has established the use of that pair of words to mark
a different contrast between supervenience relations. Another alternative would be to
call the relation “contingent supervenience”, since it allows for supervenience to hold
contingently. But the relation also holds non-contingently between some relata, such as
any fact and itself. It would sound odd to say that some contingent supervenience claims
are non-contingent.
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supervenience is weaker than supervenience.
The proposal, then, is to replace S by S@:
S@ If Γ grounds A, then A actuality-sensitively supervenes on Γ.
Since grounding is factive, that A grounds A ∨B entails that A is true, and
hence every world that is A-indiscernible from the actual world is one in
which A is true. Since A is false in both members of the pair of worlds that
provided a counterexample to S, that pair does not threaten S@.
However, S@ is not a thesis in which the concept of supervenience plays a
distinctive role. For among actually obtaining facts, the relation of actuality-
sensitive supervenience is coextensive with the relation of entailment defined
earlier.11
Given that grounding is factive, and thus holds only among obtaining
facts, S@ is equivalent to E:
E If Γ grounds A, then Γ entails A.
In contrast to the link between grounding and supervenience, E has received
some discussion in the literature. It expresses what we may call a “necessitar-
ian” view of grounding, and is endorsed by Correia (2005) and Rosen (2010),
for example. Necessitarians can therefore accept a link between grounding
and supervenience, in the form of S@.
But E has come under attack by what we may call “contingentists” about
grounding (e.g. Dancy (2004), Skiles (2012) and Leuenberger (forthcoming)).
Hence S@ is likewise controversial. A full evaluation of E and S@ is beyond
the scope of this article. My next question will be conditional: supposing
that we reject S@, do grounding claims still entail significant supervenience
claims? The answer to that question will also be relevant for necessitarians,
in a sense to be explained.
11Assume that A and all members of Γ obtain and that A actuality-sensitively supervenes
on Γ. Now suppose that all members of Γ obtain in w. Then w is Γ-indiscernible from @.
By actuality-sensitive supervenience, w and @ are A-indiscernible. Since A obtains in @,
it does so in w. So Γ entails A.
For the other direction, assume that A and all members of Γ actually obtain, and that
Γ entails A. Let w be any world that is Γ-indiscernible from @. Since all members of Γ
obtain in @, they all obtain in w. Hence A, which is entailed by Γ, obtains in w. So @
and w are A-indiscernible, and A actuality-sensitively supervenes on Γ.
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4 The problem of blockers
To motivate the rejection of S@, I shall consider a case discussed in detail by
Bricker (2006): the relationship between particular facts—e.g. that Harry
is a black raven—and general facts—e.g. that all ravens are black. Bricker
argues that there is a sense in which the general facts are determined by the
particular facts:
[A]re the general facts determined by the particular facts? . . .
Perhaps it is of some help to note that the determination rela-
tion in question is non-causal, and holds of necessity. . . . [I]f the
atomic truths determine the general truths, in the relevant sense,
then the general propositions hold or fail to hold in virtue of, or
because of, the holding or failing to hold of the atomic proposi-
tions. (Bricker, 2006, p. 255)
Bricker does not use the regimented idiom of grounding. He is among the
philosophers who prefer to express claims of determination and dependence
in terms of supervenience, rather than introducing a new primitive. But a
friend of primitive grounding could take the quote to provide a reason to
hold that any given general fact A is grounded by the class of its particular
instances.
But, as is well-known since the days of Russell, general facts are not
entailed by the class of their particular instances. The instances may all hold
in another world and the general fact yet be falsified by a particular that is
alien, i.e. does not actually exist. So E, and hence S@ fail.
We may call this the problem of blockers for S@. The counterinstance in
world w is a blocker for the general fact—it prevents it from obtaining in
w. More generally, B is a blocker for A relative to Γ iff Γ grounds A in the
actual world, and there is a possible world where all members of Γ obtain,
and B, or B together with some members of Γ, grounds ¬A (the negation of
A).
Bricker, however, claims that the general facts do supervene on the par-
ticular facts. This gives rise to a prima facie puzzle: how can he uphold that
claim in the face of Russell’s observation?
The resolution of the puzzle consists in noting that Bricker’s superve-
nience claim is not the same as the one I have considered. Suppose that
Γ rigidly designates the class of actual particular facts. Then my denial of
the supervenience of the general on the particular can be expressed by saying
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that general facts fail to actuality-sensitively supervene on Γ. Bricker, in con-
trast, claims that general facts supervene on the particular facts—allowing
that in other possible worlds, there are particular facts that do not actually
exist. If a is an individual that exists in w but not in the actual world, then
facts about a will be among the particular facts of world w, but not of the
actual world.
Earlier, I defined worlds w and w′ to be Γ-indiscernible iff for every mem-
ber of Γ, w and w′ are A-indiscernible. We can now see that this definition has
two readings. On the reading of the previous section, which is not Bricker’s, Γ
is a class that has its membership necessarily. On Bricker’s reading, Γ stands
for a type of facts, with potentially varying membership across worlds. Thus
worlds w and w′ are Γ-indiscernible if every Γ-facts that exists—and there-
fore obtains—in world w also obtains in w′, and every Γ-fact that exists in
w′ also obtains in w.
It is clear what the contrast between the readings is. It is less clear how to
label it. I prefer to say that we have two different first relata of supervenience:
classes of facts and types of facts, respectively.
For our purposes, a type TΓ—can be modeled by a function that maps
a world to a class of facts that obtain in that world. We can then say
that worlds w and w′ are TΓ-indiscernible iff TΓ(w) = TΓ(w′), that is, if the
function returns the same value for these two worlds. Since every member
of TΓ(w) obtains in w, and likewise for TΓ(w
′) and w′, the TΓ-indiscernibility
of w and w′ has the consequence that every A ∈ TΓ(w) obtains in w′, and
every A ∈ TΓ(w′) obtains in w.
Supervenience is defined in terms of indiscernibility as before: T∆ su-
pervenes on TΓ iff any TΓ-indiscernible worlds are T∆-indiscernible. It is
straightforward to modify this definition in such a way that the first relatum
is a class and the second a type, or vice versa.
If we did not wish to speak of types, we might alternatively hold that
there are two kinds of classes: classes of one kind have their membership
essentially, while classes of the other have it accidentally.12 Note that it
would be terminologically unfortunate to contrast “class” with “property”,
“attribute”, or “intension”, as is natural in analogous contexts. For Bricker’s
intended claim is not that the property being a general fact supervenes on the
property being a particular fact. That latter claim might be true even if—per
12Compare the temporal rather than modal case: “The class of billionaires has been
growing every year.” For relevant discussion, see Sharvy (1968) and Fine (1981).
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impossibile—different general facts held in two worlds that are indiscernible
with respect to the particular facts.
As explained above, the first reading of the supervenience thesis does not
yield an interesting and distinctive claim: actuality-sensitive supervenience is
just entailment, or strict implication, under yet another name. But Bricker’s
reading does provide an interesting claim. He is surely right that we want to
say that general facts supervene on the particular facts. The expression “the
particular facts” denotes what I call a type of facts.
Let us return to our question whether grounding claims entail superve-
nience claims. We may try the following, where TΓ denotes the type of facts
to which all members of Γ belong, and to which no other actual facts belong:
TS If Γ grounds A, then A supervenes on TΓ.
Alternatively, we could replace A in the consequent of TS by TA(= T{A}). I
shall only discuss that variant separately if the difference matters.
TS seems to solve the problem of blockers we have encountered. In the
example above, a certain particular fact B of w involving an alien particular
blocks a general fact that obtains in the actual world. But even though B is
not in Γ (it is not an actual particular fact) it is in TΓ (it belongs to the same
fact-type as all the actual particular facts). So @ and w are TΓ-discernible,
and there is no counterinstance to TS.
What is more, TS can also deal with the instance of the problem of mul-
tiple realizers upon which S floundered. The worlds w and w′, as described,
are indiscernible with respect to the microfact BM that actually grounds the
thermodynamic fact AT—BM fails to obtain in both of them—but discernible
with respect to AT . But they differ with respect to the type that BM belongs
to—in w but not in w′, some such microfact obtains.
We may note that the possibility of blockers also threatens another su-
pervenience claim involving facts and their grounds (suggested by an anony-
mous referee): that any non-fundamental fact A supervenes on the class of
all its possible grounds. Or, more precisely, that if A is necessarily non-
fundamental, then A supervenes on G(A), where G(A) is the class of all
facts B such that for some world w and some Γ, {B} ∪ Γ grounds A in w.
That supervenience claim is immune to the problem of multiple realizers. It
may fail, however, in blocking scenarios. For in such a scenario, the crucial
difference between w and the actual world concerns the blocking fact. But
presumably, that fact is not among the grounds of A in any possible world,
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and is thus not in G(A). So w and the actual world are A-discernible without
being G(A)-discernible.
5 The reference type problem
For all its virtues, TS faces an important objection: if Γ is simply a class of
actual facts, we are not entitled to use the definite description “the type of
Γ”. There may be more than one type of facts such that Γ consists of all
and only its actual instances, and a given fact A may supervene on some of
these types but not on others. TS is not well-defined. This is what I call the
“reference type problem”.
The function TΓ which models the type of Γ needs to satisfy some con-
straints. The first one is that TΓ(@) = Γ: the actual members of the type of
Γ are all and only the members of Γ. A second constraint we may wish to
impose is that membership in a given type is essential to a fact, such that if
A obtains in both w and w′, then A ∈ TΓ(w) iff A ∈ TΓ(w′). Together, these
constraints ensure that TΓ(w) includes all Γ-facts that obtain in w, and does
not include any actual facts that are not in Γ. But consider a world w, and
any fact obtaining at w that is alien, in the sense of not obtaining in the
actual world. An alien fact may be a fact whose negation obtains in the ac-
tual world, or it may be a fact constituted by alien properties or particulars.
Then if a function TΓ with A ∈ TΓ(w) satisfies the two constraints, so does
T ′Γ, which is like TΓ except that A 6∈ TΓ′(w). Conversely, if T ′Γ satisfies the
constraint, so does TΓ. The most inclusive such function includes every alien
fact at every world; the least inclusive includes no alien fact at any world.
In between, there are countless other functions. This means that for all that
has been said, there are a huge number of different types associated with a
given class of facts Γ.
A related problem for formulating claims of grounding or reduction in
terms of supervenience has been noted in passing by Kit Fine (2001, p. 11),
and called the “reference class problem”, after a well-known challenge for
frequentist accounts of single-case probability. A reference class problem for
supervenience arises, for example, if we wish to say that a fact A reduces
to a fact B iff every member of the reference class of A supervenes on the
reference class of B. The two problems are distinct: in one case, we are to
associate a fact with a class of facts; in the other case, we are to associate
a class of facts with a function from possible worlds to classes of facts. I do
11
not wish to discuss the reference class problem here.13
Is the reference type problem fatal for TS? This depends on whether we
are prepared to accept a certain version of inegalitarianism about fact types,
in analogy to the more familiar inegalitarianism about properties (Lewis,
1983). Indeed, inegalitarianism seems quite plausible. Some of the functions
that satisfy the constraints are more natural than others, and have a bet-
ter claim to correspond to types. The type of particular facts is naturally
associated with the class of actual particular facts. For another example,
let Γm be the class that consists of all actual mass facts—instantiations of
some determinate of mass by some individual. Then some alien facts have
a much better claim to belong to the type of Γm than others. For example,
the fact that alien individual a has a mass of 1 gram has a better claim to be
in TΓm(w) than certain other facts of world w—say, that a has unit positive
charge, or that Vienna is the capital of the United States. Nor does this
appear to be a consequence of me describing Γm as the “class of actual mass
facts”. Rather, it seems to be a matter of the objective resemblance among
facts.
But while it is plausible that some functions have a better claim to repre-
sent a type than others, it is unclear whether there a unique privileged one,
which deserves the definite description “the type of Γ”. One may think that
T is defined for some Γ but not others, and hence that TS is defined for some
Γ but not others. For simplicity, I shall often speak of accepting or rejecting
TS without considering more discriminating attitudes.
The reference type problem does not, of course, cast doubt on whether
supervenience is a well-defined relation. It only casts doubt on whether there
is a path from grounding to supervenience.
For the sake of the argument, I shall assume in the next two sections that
there is a privileged type, and hence that T is defined and TS meaningful.
13Fine’s discussion is highly compressed. He considers the proposal—call it “SF ”—that
“[o]ne class of propositions will reduce to—or supervene upon—another if, necessarily, any
truth from the one is entailed by truths from the other”. According to Fine, SF “faces
the . . . problem of the ‘reference class,’ for whether one proposition is reducible to others
will depend upon the classes of proposition with which they are associated”. In fact, this
problem does not arise for SF : the supervenience-condition it gives is perfectly well-defined
and does not suffer from any reference-class or reference-type problem. SF , as opposed to
the example given in the main text here, is not a suitable example to illustrate the issue.
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6 The problem of heterogeneous realizers
As noted at the end of section 4, TS is compatible with the case of multiple
realizers that I used as a counterexample to S. However, it appears to be
incompatible with heterogeneous realizers: different realizers that do not
belong to the same type. If the fact that Hilary believes that p is actually
grounded by physical facts, but is grounded by ectoplasmic facts in some
other world, it has a heterogeneous realizer in that world. Suppose that Γ
actually grounds A, and that Γ′ is a heterogeneous realizer of A in w. Then
barring brute necessary connections, there is a world w′ where neither A nor
any of its potential realizers obtains. Then w and w′ are TΓ-indiscernible—
because no facts of the type of Γ obtain in either world, say—and yet A-
discernible.
This problem also arises for the cousin of TS, mentioned briefly before,
according to which TA supervenes on TΓ if Γ grounds A. Plausibly, the type
TA associated with a single fact A is a function that maps a world w to A if
A obtains in w, and to the empty class otherwise. If so, TS and its cousin are
equivalent. But at any rate, the constraint that type membership is essential
ensures that in the example from the last paragraph, A ∈ TA(w). Since A
does not obtain in w′, A 6∈ TA(w′), and hence w and w′ are TA-discernible.
A variant of the problem of heterogeneous realization is the problem
of floaters. Roughly, a fact could be a floater if it is contingently non-
fundamental in the actual world. More precisely, A is a floater in world
w iff is grounded in the actual world, but obtains without being grounded in
w. If the fact that Rene´ is in pain is physically grounded, but is ungrounded
in another world, then it is a floater in that world.14
TS can be argued to be incompatible with the possibility of floaters.
Surely, if A is a floater in w, there is a world w′ that is TΓ-indiscernible from
w where A does not obtain. Otherwise, we would have necessities that are
not in any way derived from grounding relations, and are thus brute.
Some philosophers may have theoretical commitments that allow them to
accept the possibility of heterogeneous realizers, but not of floaters. David
14Note that if some ungrounded facts are contingently ungrounded, the type (in the
sense of section 5) of the class of actually ungrounded facts will not be captured by the
function that maps every world to the class of facts that are ungrounded in that world. The
type will track a more intrinsic property of those facts, intuitively. If microphysicalism is
true, the type might be captured by a function that maps every world to the microphysical
facts of that world.
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Lewis, for example, defines materialism and Humean supervenience as su-
pervenience theses restricted to what he calls an “inner sphere of possibility”
around the actual world, consisting of those worlds in which no alien funda-
mental property is instantiated. Materialism is then the claim that among
worlds in the inner sphere, no two differ without differing physically (Lewis,
1983); and Humean supervenience is the claim that among worlds in the in-
ner sphere, no two differ without differing in the arrangement local matters
of particular facts (Lewis, 1994). A world with a heterogeneous realizer of
an actual fact will presumably be in the outer sphere, since the realizer will
involve the instantiation of alien fundamental properties. So it is compatible
with these supervenience claims. But a world in which an actual fact is a
floater need not be in the outer sphere, on the face of it. It does not involve
the instantiation of an alien fundamental property; rather it involves the
fundamentality of a non-alien property. So that possibility appears to falsify
the supervenience theses. Since the possibility is intuitively compatible with
the truth of materialism and Humean supervenience in the actual world, a
defender of those analyses needs to be able to rule out floaters.15
Since S@ is compatible with the possibility of heterogeneous realizers and
floaters, the considerations in this section show that S@ does not entail TS.
Hence a necessitarian about grounding who is also an inegalitarian about
fact types can use both S@ and TS to articulate the link between grounding
and supervenience, provided that she rejects the possibility of heterogeneous
realizers and floaters.
Are these possibilities still compatible with some link between grounding
and supervenience? We can replace TS by a claim that stands to it as S@
stands to S:
TS@ If Γ grounds A, then A actuality-sensitively supervenes on TΓ.
TS@ is immune from the threat of heterogeneous realizers and floaters.
Clearly, TS@ is entailed by TS. Given the plausible condition that O(Γ)
entails Γ ⊆ TΓ—the condition that if a fact belongs to a type, it does so
necessarily—TS@ is also entailed by S@.
15Lewis himself takes perfectly natural properties to be necessarily fundamental. But
this is a commitment that goes beyond inegalitarianism.
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7 The problem of heterogenous blockers
Weak as it is, TS@ still rules out scenarios that are prima facie possible. For
it is incompatible with heterogeneous blockers. A fact B is a heterogeneous
blocker of A in w relative to Γ iff it is a blocker of A in w relative to Γ, and
does not belong to TΓ(w). If there is a world where B is a heterogeneous
blocker of A, then barring brute necessities, it is possible that there is a world
w′ that is TΓ-indiscernible (and not just Γ-indiscernible) from @ and in which
A fails to obtain.
Could there be heterogeneous blockers? Here is a potential example:
ΓP consists of the actual physical facts, and AR is a phenomenal fact—
that David has an experience of a particular shade of phenomenal redness,
say. A physicalist will wish to say that ΓP grounds AR. But perhaps the
instantiation of a non-physical alien fundamental property, which we might
call “chromoplasm”, would prevent David’s physical duplicate in another
world from having that experience.16 Together with Γ, that fact B would
ground the negation of A. If physicalists are right, and if this scenario is
possible, the instantiation of chromoplasm is a blocker in the technical sense
defined earlier. Clearly, though, B, as a non-physical fundamental fact, is
not of the same type as Γ, so that it is a heterogeneous blocker.
The claim that heterogeneous blockers are possible is, I take it, the most
controversial of the possibility claims that have been seen to make trouble for
putative entailments between grounding and supervenience. A philosopher
who is prepared to reject it, and who is an inegalitarian about fact types, may
use TS@ to capture an important link between grounding and supervenience.
8 Conclusion
It is often assumed that there are logically weaker supervenience claims cor-
responding to grounding claims. In this paper, I have shown this assumption
to be problematic in more than one way. In particular, I have discussed the
following four entailment theses:
S If Γ grounds A, then A supervenes on Γ.
S@ If Γ grounds A, then A actuality-sensitively supervenes on Γ.
16Hawthorne (2002), which introduces blockers into the literature, argues that their
possibility to be incompatible with physicalism. Leuenberger (2008) disagrees.
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TS If Γ grounds A, then A supervenes on TΓ.
TS@ If Γ grounds A, then A actuality-sensitively supervenes on TΓ.
The first of these entailment theses, S, has been shown to be untenable.
The third, TS, may be rejected for two different reasons: the reference type
problem, if unsolved, will leave TΓ undefined; and the possibility of either
heterogeneous realization, of floaters, or of heterogeneous blockers will falsify
it. Philosophers who reject the possibility of any blockers can accept S@ as
a fall-back position. Those who think that the reference type problem can
be solved, and accept the possibility of either heterogeneous realization or
floaters, can accept TS@ as long as they reject the possibility of heterogeneous
blockers; if they think the latter are possible, they are committed to reject
all four entailment theses.
The table below summarizes the compatibility of the above four claims
with the reference type problem remaining unsolved, and with various possi-
bilities: multiple realizability, heterogeneous realizability, blockers, and het-
erogeneous blockers. A tick indicates compatibility, a cross incompatibility.
ref. type mult. real. het. real. blockers het. blockers
S X × × × ×
S@ X X X × ×
TS × X × X ×
TS@ × X X X ×
It is beyond the scope of this paper to settle any of the substantive issues
upon which the seriousness of the reference type problem and the truth of
these possibility claims depend. Note that if the reference type problem can
be solved, and if all all the possibility claims are true, then supervenience
claims are typically logically independent from the grounding claims to which
they correspond. Rather than providing rival regimentations of the same pre-
theoretical concept, grounding and supervenience, having different relata, can
then be seen as complementary.
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